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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The jurisdiction of this Court in this matter is based
upon Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) and § 78-2-2(4) (1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The correctness of the trial court's entry of the
Order and Judgment granting Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary
Judgment where Defendants failed to present any admissible
evidence to show a dispute of material fact for trial, and
Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Standard of Review: "Because summary judgment is
granted as a matter of law, we review the trial court's ruling
for correctness." White v. Deseelhorstf 879 P.2d 1371, 1374
(Utah 1994) (affirming summary judgment).

The appellate court

evaluates only "whether the trial court erred in applying the
governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that
there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v.
State. 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (same).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES. AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-34. Sale of trust property by
trustee — Foreclosure of trust deed — Limitation of actions.
The trustee's sale of property under a trust deed
shall be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided

-1-

by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be
commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust
deed.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1. Time for commencement of
actions generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is
prescribed by statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne
profits of real property — Instrument in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
. . .

(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability
founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in
Section 78-12-22.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c).
judgment — Motion and proceedings thereon.

Summary

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
. . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . .
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

-2-

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(e). Summary
judgment — Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense
required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(c).

Definitions —

Hearsay.
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A#

Nature of the Case

This case was originally filed by Plaintiffs Stephen
D. Oliverson and Ruth H. Oliverson (referred to hereinafter
collectively as the "Oliversons") seeking, among other things, to
quiet title to certain real property described more fully herein
below (the "Property") . Defendant Lester Romero ("Romero")
counterclaimed seeking, among other things, to foreclose a
purported trust deed, dated July 2, 1986, on the Property of
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which Romero was the purported beneficiary.1

B.

Course of Proceedings

On or about December 7, 1994, the Oliversons filed a
Complaint against Romero and J. Scott Lundberg2 in which the
Oliversons sought, among other things, to quiet title to the
Property.

On or about January 31, 1995, Romero filed an Answer,

Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint seeking, among other
things, to foreclose a purported trust deed on the Property.
On or about August 15, 1996, the Oliversons filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Oliversons1 Motion") on the
ground that the applicable statute of limitations had run and
therefore barred any action to foreclose upon Romero's trust deed
as a matter of law.

Romero, acting pro se,

belatedly, and even

after Oliversons had filed a notice to submit their motion for
summary judgment to the court for decision, filed a hand-written
document entitled "Answers to Plaintiff's [sic]

Motion for

1

Nearly nine years after the fact, Romero claimed that the
July, 1986, trust deed, which said it secured a note of even date
therewith, was security for an ancient promissory note dated
April 23, 1986, in the original principal amount of $6,000.00,
pursuant to which Romero has claimed he is entitled to interest
at the rate of 2 1/2% compounded monthly (which arguably could
mean that over $100,000.00 is now owing on that ancient note
under Romero's theory).
2

J. Scott Lundberg was the successor trustee of the trust
deed by which Romero claimed an interest in the Property. J.
Scott Lundberg has not appealed the trial court's decision.
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Summary Judgment." Thereafter, the trial court granted Romero
some time after retaining counsel to file a proper memorandum in
opposition to the Oliversons1 Motion.

On or about October 15,

1996, Romero, through counsel, filed a "Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff's [sic]

Motion for Summary Judgment." The only

purported evidence Romero produced in opposition to the
Oliversons1 Motion was an affidavit signed by Romero (the "Romero
Affidavit") , which consisted entirely of inadmissible statements
and immaterial allegations, as will be shown more fully below.

C.

Disposition of the Trial Court

On March 18, 1997, the Oliversons1 Motion came on
regularly for hearing before the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Anthony W.
Schofield presiding.
hearing.

Romero was represented by counsel at the

After hearing the oral arguments of counsel, the trial

court ruled from the bench, granting the Oliversons1 Motion,
declaring the foreclosure of Romero's trust deed was time-barred
and that the Romero trust deed was null, void, and of no force or
effect whatsoever, thereby quieting title to the Property in the
Oliversons.

At the trial court's instruction, the Oliversons'

counsel prepared an Order and Judgment which was signed and
approved as to form by Romero's counsel, and ultimately signed
and entered by the Honorable Judge Anthony W. Schofield.
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The

Order and Judgment included the court's Rule 54(b) certification
finding that "[t]here is no just reason for delay and the Court
directs that a summary judgment . . . be entered in favor of
Plaintiffs and Huish, as provided in Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, pursuant to Plaintiffs' and Huish's respective
motions for summary judgment."3

D.

Statement of Facts

The Property that is the subject of this case is
located in Utah County, State of Utah, and is more particularly
described as:
COMMENCING 4.90 % chains South of the Northwest corner
of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 19, Township 4 South,
Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian and running
thence East 165 feet; thence North 69 feet; thence
North 82° 39' West 187.5 feet; thence South 5° 21' West
95.4 feet; thence North 86.5 East 30 feet to the Point
of Beginning.4
Third Party Defendant Robert K. Huish, a/k/a Bob K.
Huish ("Huish"), previously owned the Property.5

While he owned

the Property, Huish signed a trust deed (the "Trust Deed")
recorded on the Property in favor of Romero, as beneficiary,

3

Record, page 379, para. 3 (Order and Judgment).

4

Record, page 378, para. 5 (Order and Judgment).

5

Record, page 194, para. 5 (Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellant
herein, -page 3, para. 4.

dated July 2, 1986.6

The Trust Deed expressly stated that it

secured a "promissory note of even date herewith."7

Huish further

signed a promissory note in favor of Romero, also dated July 2,
1986 (the "July Note").8
The July Note expressly provided that it was payable
in full "upon closing of the sale of" the Property.9

On or before

October 29, 1986, Huish sold the Property to the Oliversons.10
Romero did not initiate any foreclose of the Trust Deed until the
filing of his Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint on or after
January 31, 1995.n

6

Record, page 194, paras. 2-5 (Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment); see also Brief of DefendantAppellant herein, page 3, para. 4.
7

Record, page 194, para. 3 (Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment); Record, page 17, para. 6 (Complaint);
Record, page 46, para. 5 (Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party
Complaint).
8

Record, page 194, para. 4 (Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment); Record, page 17, para. 6 (Complaint);
Record, page 46, para. 5 (Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party
Complaint).
9

Record, page 193, para. 6 (Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment); Record, page 16, para. 8 (Complaint);
Record, page 46, para. 6 (Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party
Complaint).
10

Record, page 193, para. 7 (Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellant
herein, page 3, para. 5.
11

Record, page 193, para. 8 (Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment); Record, pages 48-32 (Answer, Counterclaim
and Third Party Complaint); see also Brief of Defendant-Appellant
-7-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Huish signed the recorded Trust Deed on the Property
dated July 2, 1986. The Trust Deed clearly, expressly, and
unambiguously stated it secured a "promissory note of even date
herewith." Huish also signed the July Note, also dated July 2,
1986.

Since the Trust Deed and the July Note are "of even date,"

by the plain language of the Trust Deed, the Trust Deed secured
the July Note.
The July Note provided it was payable in full "upon
closing of the sale of" the Property.

It is undisputed that the

closing on the sale of the Property from Huish to the Oliversons
occurred on or before October 29, 1986, and that such sale
triggered Huish's obligation to pay the July Note in full.

That

sale also, therefore, triggered the running of the statute of
limitations to foreclose the Trust Deed pursuant to Utah's trust
deed foreclosure statute, so that Romero had only until October
29, 1992, at the latest, to foreclose the Trust Deed.
Romero, however, failed to commence foreclosure of the
Trust Deed until he filed his Counterclaim and Third Party
Complaint on or after January 31, 1995.

Since that date is more

than two (2) years beyond the running of the applicable statute
of limitations, Romero's attempted foreclosure of the Trust Deed
was time-barred.

As a matter of law, the Trust Deed is no

herein, page 4, para. 8.
-8-

longer a valid lien against the Property, and the trial court was
correct in so holding and in granting summary judgment quieting
title to the Property in the Oliversons.
Romero argued to the trial court, and is once again
here arguing, that there existed disputed questions of material
fact precluding summary judgment.

Specifically, Romero argues

there were disputes over what note the Trust Deed secured,
whether the statute of limitations for an action on such note
(and accordingly to foreclose the Trust Deed) had been tolled,
and whether such note had been satisfied.
Romero's arguments, however, are simply an attempt to
cloud the issues and create the appearance of a factual dispute
where in fact the issues in this case are clear and simple, and
the material facts are undisputed.

To begin with, Romero claims

he thought the Trust Deed secured a note dated April 23, 1986
(the "April Note") , rather than the July Note as clearly stated
in the Trust Deed.

Romero further states that Huish made certain

payments on the April Note after he sold the Property to the
Oliversons which tolled the statute of limitations to foreclose
the Trust Deed.

Romero's claim, however, that he thought the

Trust Deed secured the April Note, is inadmissible parol evidence
offered in an attempt to alter the clear and unambiguous language
of the Trust Deed, dated July 2, 1986, that it secured a
"promissory note of even date herewith," viz.

-9-

a promissory note

dated July 2, 1986.

Since the Trust Deed secures the July Notef

any purported evidence of any post-sale payments on the April
Note are immaterial to this case and ineffective to preclude
summary judgment.
In an apparent attempt to cloud the issue, in his
brief to this Court, when speaking of the purported post-sale
payments that Romero claims tolled the statute of limitations,
Romero claims such payments were made on an "Obligation," which
term Romero vaguely defined to encompass either the July Note or
the April Note.

It is clear, however, on the face of Romero's

own affidavit (the only evidence offered in opposition to summary
judgment), that such purported post-sale payments, if any, were
only on the April Note.

Those alleged payments, therefore, are

totally irrelevant and immaterial because the Trust Deed by its
express terms secured the July Note, as the trial court correctly
held.
Romero further argues summary judgment was
inappropriate because he claims there was a dispute over whether
the vaguely defined "Obligation" had been satisfied.

That issue

is totally irrelevant to this appeal, since the Oliversons'
Motion was based on the running of the applicable statute of
limitations, and not upon the obligation secured by the Trust
Deed having been satisfied.

It is the Oliversons1 position that

the evidence at a trial would have clearly shown that Romero has

-10-

been paid in full on the July Note (the note actually secured by
the Trust Deed, and therefore the only note of significance to
this case).12

It was assumed, however, for the purposes of

summary judgment only, and specifically to avoid a factual
dispute, that the July Note had not been satisfied.

The trial

court did not reach the issue of whether the July Note and the
Trust Deed had been satisfied, nor did it need to.

The real

issue in this appeal, the issue on which summary judgment was
granted, is the running and expiration of the statute of
limitations to foreclose the Trust Deed.

It is unnecessary and

completely irrelevant to consider in this appeal whether the July
Note has been satisfied, and Romero's arguments on that issue are
totally off-point.
Romero also argues the statute of limitations to
foreclose the Trust Deed was tolled by Huish allegedly being
outside the State of Utah.

The only assertion in the Romero

Affidavit in support of that claim, however, is that Romero was
told Huish was outside the State of Utah.

12

Since that is clearly

Only because Romero himself has irrelevantly raised the
payment issue on this appeal, the Oliversons note that they have
strong evidence in their possession to show that Romero has been
paid in full on the July Note, and that he deposited such payment
in the account of an alias name under which he has actually been
criminally prosecuted leading to a guilty plea for welfare fraud.
Again, however, payment simply is not at issue on this appeal
from a ruling on the applicable statute of limitations, and
payment therefore raises no factual issues whatsoever in this
appeal.

-11-

hearsay, it is inadmissible and does not preclude summary
judgment.13
Since the Romero Affidavit does not contain any
admissible or material evidence, there was no genuine dispute
over any material fact in this case, and the Oliversons were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the running of
the statute of limitations.

Accordingly, the trial court

correctly granted summary judgment for the Oliversons, and this
Court should uphold that decision.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FOR THE OLIVERSONS SINCE ROMERO FAILED TO PRODUCE
ANY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE SHOWING A DISPUTE OF
MATERIAL FACT FOR TRIAL
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of

summary judgment in favor of the Oliversons because there was no
admissible evidence presented to show the existence of a dispute
of material fact for trial.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure states that summary judgment "shall be rendered
forthwith if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

Which in any event is contrary to the admissible affidavit
of Huish himself stating unequivocally that he was in the State
of Utah at all relevant times. See Record, pages 343-42
(Affidavit of Bob Huish).

-12-

matter of law." The Utah Supreme Court has explained that "[a]
major purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial
by allowing the parties to pierce the pleadings to determine
whether there is a genuine issue to present to the fact finder."
Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776, 779
(Utah 1984) (affirming summary judgment where opposing affidavit
was insufficient to create genuine factual issue for trial).

The

only alleged evidence Romero produced in opposition to summary
judgment was the Romero Affidavit.

Since the Romero Affidavit

consisted entirely of inadmissible and immaterial evidence, it
was insufficient to raise a genuine issue to present to a fact
finder, and therefore was insufficient to preclude summary
judgment.
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein." "The mere assertion that an issue
of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to support
that assertion is insufficient to preclude the granting of a
summary judgment motion." Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172
(Utah 1983) (upholding summary judgment where opposing affidavit
was "based on an inadmissible hearsay statement") . Thus, parol

-13-

evidence, hearsay, and any other statements in an affidavit that
would not be admissible if testified to at trial, may not
effectively oppose summary judgment.

See id.; Western States

Thrift & Loan v. Blomquistr 29 Utah 2d 58, 60, 504 P.2d 1019,
1021 (Utah 1972) (affirming summary judgment where opposing
affidavit "did not conform to the requirements of Rule 56(e)"
since it was based on hearsay); Rainford v. Rytingr 22 Utah 2d
252, 255, 451 P.2d 769, 771 (Utah 1969) (affirming summary
judgment where opposing affidavits "consisted entirely of
inadmissible parol evidence") .
Even if an affidavit opposing summary judgment
contains evidence that is admissible under Rule 56(e), it is
ineffective to preclude summary judgment under Rule 56(c) unless
such evidence shows there is a dispute of material fact. The
mere existence of disputed issues generally in a case "does not
preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues are
immaterial to resolution of the case." Horgan v. Indus. Design
Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982) (upholding summary judgment
dismissing attack on validity of settlement agreement where the
only disputed facts concerned the underlying dispute rather than
the settlement agreement); see also Heglar RanchP Inc. v.
Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980) (holding Rule 56(c)
does not preclude summary judgment "simply whenever some fact
remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely
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controverted") .
As will be shown more fully below, the Romero
Affidavit, the only purported evidence Romero presented in
opposition to the Oliversons1 Motion, consisted entirely of
inadmissible parol evidence and hearsay, and immaterial
allegations.

The Romero Affidavit therefore was wholly

insufficient to preclude summary judgment, both under Rule 56(c)
and Rule 56(e).

Since there was no admissible evidence disputing

any material fact, there was nothing to present to a fact finder,
and a trial was therefore unnecessary.

Accordingly, the trial

court was correct in granting summary judgment for the
Oliversons, and this Court should affirm that decision.

A.

THE STATEMENT IN THE ROMERO AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING
ROMERO7S PURPORTED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT NOTE THE
TRUST DEED SECURED IS INADMISSIBLE PAROL EVIDENCE
The statement in the Romero Affidavit that "it was and

is [Romero's] understanding that [the Trust Deed] secures a
promissory note dated April 23, 1986"14 is inadmissible parol
evidence in light of the clear and unambiguous language of the
Trust Deed stating it secured the July Note.

In any event, even

if it were admissible, that statement is not competent to and

14

Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added).
-15-

does not alter the Trust Deed.
"In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of a
deed is a question of law" for the court.

Terry v. Price Mun.

Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 149 (Utah 1989) (resolving dispute over
intent of deed as a question of law by construing the language of
the deed at issue).

When the terms of a deed are "clear and

unambiguous," it is the court's duty to construe the deed as it
is written, giving the language its "plain and ordinary meaning
without resorting to extrinsic evidence." Homer v. Smith, 866
P.2d 622, 629 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming trial court's
determination as to the plain language of the deed), cert, denied
sub nom. Homer v. Sandy Hills, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994).
In this case the Trust Deed clearly and unambiguously
states it secures "a promissory note of even date herewith."
Since the Trust Deed is dated July 2, 1986, the clear, plain, and
ordinary meaning of that language is that the Trust Deed secured
a promissory note also dated July 2, 1986.

The July Note is

dated July 2, 1986. Given its plain meaning, the Trust Deed
clearly and unambiguously referred to and was security for the
July Note, as the trial court correctly held.
The only evidence Romero offered in opposition to the
foregoing is the statement in the Romero Affidavit that:
With respect to the Trust Deed dated July 2,
1986, (the "Trust Deed") which was recorded against the
property and which is the subject of this lawsuit, it
was and is my understanding that it secures a promissoy
-16-

note dated April 23, 1986, (the "Note") [emphasis
added] .15
It is clearly Romero's hope that if he can succeed in
altering the Trust Deed to secure the April Note, he may be able
to prove the statute of limitations for him to foreclose the
Trust Deed was tolled by certain payments Huish purportedly made
on the April Note after Huish sold the Property to the
Oliversons.

However, not only is the Romero Affidavit completely

lacking any foundation or explanation whatsoever as to how or why
Romero purportedly came to such an "understanding," (see e.g.
Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Rec. Corp.r 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d
538, 542 (Utah 1973) (holding affidavit insufficient to preclude
summary judgment where it merely reflected the affiant's
"unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions")) , but in the face of
the clear and unambiguous language of the Trust Deed that it
secured the July Note, the statement that Romero purportedly
thought the Trust Deed secured the April Note is inadmissible
parol evidence, insufficient to preclude summary judgment.
Parol evidence is not admissible to alter the clear
and unambiguous terms of a deed.

Gillmor v. Cummings, 904 P.2d

703, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding interpretation of
unambiguous deed description is question of law, and parol

15

Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added).
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evidence is not admissible).

Where a writing "is clear on its

face, the trial court need not—and in fact should not—consider
evidence of a contrary meaning."

Projects Unlimited v. Cooper

State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738, 753 (Utah 1990) (affirming summary
judgment rendered solely on interpretation of terms of recorded
lien release).

The Trust Deed clearly and unambiguously states

that it secured the July Note.

Accordingly, the completely

unfounded statement in the Romeo Affidavit that Romero understood
the Trust Deed secured the April Note is groundless inadmissible
parol evidence, ineffective to preclude summary judgment.
Rainford v. Rytingr 22 Utah 2d 252, 254, 451 P.2d 769,
770 (Utah 1969), is particularly instructive to the case at bar.
Rainford was an action to hold personally liable the guarantors
on a corporate contract.

Summary judgment was granted holding

the guarantors personally liable.

Id.

The guarantors appealed,

arguing they had raised a dispute of fact precluding summary
judgment by claiming in an affidavit filed on their behalf that
there was a certain condition to the contract.

Id.

Noting such

alleged condition did not appear on the face of the contract,
however, the Utah Supreme Court concluded the guarantors were
impermissibly seeking to vary the terms of the contract by parol
evidence.

Thus, explaining Rule 56(e) requires affidavits

opposing summary judgment to set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence, the Court concluded summary judgment
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against the guarantors "must be sustained, since [their]
affidavit consisted entirely of inadmissible parol evidence,
submitted for the purpose of varying and adding to the terms of
the written agreement of the parties." Rainford, 22 Utah 2d at
255, 451 P.2d at 771.
Just as the guarantors in Rainford were attempting to
alter the terms of the contract by their affidavit, in this case
Romero is attempting to alter the terms of the Trust Deed by the
Romero Affidavit.

The parol evidence rule, however, prohibits

Romero from altering the clear and unambiguous terms of the Trust
Deed that it secured the July Note by stating he subjectively
thought the Trust Deed secured another note.16 As in Rainford,
therefore, the Romero Affidavit is ineffective under Rule 56(e)
to preclude summary judgment since it consists of inadmissible
parol evidence.
Additionally, Romero's claimed "understanding" of the
Trust Deed, even if it were admissible (which it is not), is not
competent evidence to alter the Trust Deed in any event.
Romerofs affidavit does not even allege that the Trust Deed in
fact secured the April Note, nor that either Romero or Huish
(much less both of them) intended the Trust Deed to secure the
April Note, nor even that there was any mistake whatsoever in the
16

Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion
for Summary Judgment).
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Trust Deed's language that it secured the July Note.

Romero's

affidavit states only, without any supporting or explanatory
facts of any kind, that Romero himself subjectively understood
the Trust Deed secured the April Note.

Even if that claimed

understanding were admissible (which it is not), it is not a
viable legal ground on which to alter the clear, express, and
unambiguous terms of the Trust Deed that it secured the July
Note, and is therefore insufficient to preclude summary judgment
in any event.

B.

THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE ROMERO AFFIDAVIT THAT HUISH
MADE CERTAIN PAYMENTS ON THE APRIL NOTE ARE
IMMATERIAL TO THIS CASE BECAUSE THE TRUST DEED
SECURED THE JULY NOTE
Romero's claim that the statute of limitations was

tolled by certain payments Huish allegedly made on the April Note
(the "Post-Sale Payments") is immaterial to this case, and
therefore is insufficient to preclude summary judgment, because
the Trust Deed secured the July Note, not the April Note.

Facts

that are immaterial to the resolution of a case are insufficient
to preclude the entry of summary judgment.

Horgan v. Indus.

Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982).
In his brief to this Court, Romero claims Huish made
certain Post-Sale Payments on "the Obligation secured by the
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Trust Deed."17

By vaguely defining the term "Obligation" to

encompass "either the April 23, 1986 note or the July 2, 1986
note,"18 Romero has attempted in this appeal to create the
appearance of a factual dispute over whether such alleged PostSale Payments could have applied to the July Note and therefore
could have tolled the statute of limitations to foreclose the
Trust Deed that secured the July Note. A review of the Romero
Affidavit, however, clearly reveals that the only evidence Romero
offered regarding any Post-Sale Payments refers expressly and
exclusively to payments on the April Note.

Romero claims in his

affidavit that he received certain Post-Sale Payments "as partial
satisfaction of the amount owing under the Note."19

"Note" is a

specifically-defined term in the Romero Affidavit, defined by
Romero to refer to "a promissory note dated April 23 P 1986"20
(i.e., the April Note).

By using the term "Obligation" in his

brief to this Court when referring to the alleged Post-Sale
Payments, Romero is attempting to distance himself from his own

Brief of Defendant-Appellant, page 13.
18

Brief of Defendant-Appellant, page 10.

19

Record, page 363, para. 5 (Defendants Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion
for Summary Judgment).
20

Record, pages 364-63, para. 2 (Defendant's Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added).
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affidavit and disguise the fact that his only purported evidence
of any claimed Post-Sale Payments relates only to the April Note,
which as a matter of law is not secured by the Trust Deed and
therefore is immaterial and ineffective to preclude summary
judgment.

At no time, including in his brief to this Court and

his own affidavit, has Romero ever alleged or even argued, that
Huish ever made any Post-Sale Payments whatsoever on the July
Note which the Trust Deed secured.
Romero also improperly argues there is a dispute as to
whether the "Obligation" secured by the Trust Deed has been
satisfied.

For purposes of this appeal there is no such dispute

because for purposes of the Oliversons' Motion only it was
assumed, arguendo,

and specifically for the purpose of avoiding a

factual dispute on the issue, that the July Note (which, again,
is the note the Trust Deed secured) had not been satisfied.21

In

any event, however, the satisfaction of the July Note is
completely irrelevant and immaterial to the issue on which
summary judgment was granted, and therefore to the issue now
before this Court, viz.,

the running and expiration of the

applicable statute of limitations for Romero to foreclose on the
aged Trust Deed.

Even if it were disputed, which it was not for

21

Record, page 168 (Plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary
Judgment); Record, page 196 (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment).
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the purposes of summary judgment, the issue of the satisfaction
of the July Note could not preclude summary judgment.

The

applicable statute of limitations has still run even if the July
Note was not paid.

See Horganf 657 P.2d at 752 (holding dispute

over issues that are "immaterial to resolution of the case" is
insufficient to preclude summary judgment).

C.

THE STATEMENT IN THE ROMERO AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING
HUISH'S PURPORTED ABSENCE FROM THE STATE IS
INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
The statement in the Romero Affidavit that "[i]n 1992

and 1993 [Romero] was informed" that Huish was outside the State
of Utah22 is pure hearsay which fails the standard for
admissibility under Rule 56(e) and is therefore insufficient to
preclude summary judgment.

"Hearsay and opinion testimony that

would not be admissible if testified to at the trial may not
properly be set forth in an affidavit" opposing summary judgment.
Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Rec. Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d
538, 542 (Utah 1973) (holding affidavit insufficient to preclude
summary judgment).
Since the Romero Affidavit does not purport to state
any personal knowledge or evidentiary facts on the issue, but

Record, page 363, para. 7 (Defendant's Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added).
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states only that Romero "was informed" that Huish had left the
state,23 that statement is inadmissible hearsay.

See Utah R.

Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay as any "statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted).24
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held statements
similar to those in the Romero Affidavit inadmissible to oppose
summary judgment under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

In Western States Thrift & Loan v. BlomquistP 504

P.2d 1019 (Utah 1972), for example, the defendant filed an
affidavit opposing summary judgment in which the defendant stated
he had been "informed" of certain facts that the defendant
contended created a dispute precluding summary judgment.

The

Blomquist Court noted that "an affidavit opposing a motion for
summary judgment is an evidentiary affidavit, whose form and
content is governed by 56(e)."

Id. at 1020-21. The Court then

upheld summary judgment, explaining "[t]he assertions in
defendant's affidavit, which were essential to create a genuine
issue as to a material fact, were based on information and belief
23

Record, page 363, para. 7 (Defendant's Affidavit in
Support of Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's [sic] Motion
for Summary Judgment) (emphasis added).
24

In any event, that statement is legally insufficient to
counter the admissible affidavit of Huish himself which clearly
and unequivocally states that at all relevant times Huish resided
in the State of Utah and was in fact within the State of Utah.
Record,-pages 343-42, paras. 2 and 4 (Affidavit of Bob Huish).
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and hearsay, and did not conform to the requirements of Rule
56(e)."

Id^ at 1021; see also Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170,

1172-73 (Utah 1983) (upholding summary judgment where opposing
affidavit stated merely that affiant had been "told" certain
facts, since such statement was inadmissible hearsay).
Romero's mere assertion that he was told or informed
that Huish was out of state is hearsay that would be inadmissible
if testified to at the trial of this case.25 Therefore, Romero's
assertion is not admissible to oppose summary judgment.

II.

NONE OP THE LAW CITED BY ROMERO SUPPORTS
REVERSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Romero has not cited any law that would support this

Court's reversal of the summary judgment granted by the trial
court.

The only law Romero has cited is off-point and

insufficient to warrant this Court's reversal of summary
judgment.

For example, Romero cited Projects Unlimited,. Inc. v.

Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.r 798 P.2d 738 (Utah 1990), Bill
Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977), ProMark
Group, Inc. v. Harris Corp.,860 P.2d 964 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
and Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827 (Utah

Such hearsay is, in any event, legally insufficient to
contradict the express statement of Huish himself in his own
affidavit that he was at all relevant times within the State of
Utah. See Record, pages 343-42, paras. 2 and 4 (Affidavit of Bob
Huish).
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Ct. App. 1989) for the propositions that the facts and inferences
should be construed in a light most favorable to the party
opposing summary judgment, and that all doubts should be resolved
in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

Brown Realty

and Beehive are both distinguishable from the case at bar,
however, because they involved unclear and ambiguous documents
that left factual questions.

Projects and ProMark, on the other

hand, actually support the trial court's decision in this case
because they upheld summary judgment based on the interpretation
of clear and unambiguous terms in the governing documents.
Since the applicable statute of limitations has
expired as a matter of law, Romero's attempted foreclosure of the
Trust Deed is time-barred, precluding any possible relief to
Romero in this case. Accordingly, Romero's citations to Frisbee
v. K&K Const. Co., 676 P.2d 327 (Utah 1984) and Tanner v. Utah
Poultry & Farmers Coop.P 359 P.2d 18 (Utah 1961) for the
proposition that summary judgment should be granted only when the
moving party shows, as a matter of law, that no relief is
possible, are completely inapposite to this case.
The cases Romero cited for the propositions that a
single sworn statement can raise a factual dispute precluding
summary judgment are also inapplicable to this case because that
rule assumes the sworn statements contain admissible evidence,
which Romero has not produced in this case.
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The only statement

Romero produced in this case was his own affidavit, and such
affidavit did not contain any evidence admissible under the
standards of Rule 56(e) to oppose summary judgment, as shown
above.
Likewise, Romero's citations for the proposition that
courts should be cautious in granting summary judgment and thus
depriving litigants of the opportunity to present their case at
trial do not apply because Romero has not produced any admissible
evidence for trial.

See Reagan Outdoor Advertisingf Inc. v.

Lundgren. 692 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) ("A major purpose of
summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the
parties to pierce the pleadings to determine whether there is a
genuine issue to present to the fact finder") .
Moreover, the cases cited by Romero regarding the
general rule which allows a tolling of the statute of limitations
by virtue of payments on the underlying note are also
inapplicable to this case because, as shown above, there were no
payments on the July Note which the Trust Deed secured.
Finally, the cases cited by Romero regarding tolling
of the statute of limitations by a defendant's absence from the
state also do not apply because Romero has not produced any
admissible evidence to show Huish was outside the State of Utah
at any relevant time.

-27-

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for
the Oliversons based upon the running of the statute of
limitations because there were no admissible or material disputed
facts for trial on that issue.

Since the Trust Deed clearly and

unambiguously states it secured the July Note, Romero's assertion
that he thought the Trust Deed secured the April Note is
inadmissible parol evidence lacking any foundation whatsoever,
and in any event is legally insufficient to alter the Trust Deed;
Romero's claim that Huish made certain Post-Sale Payments on the
April Note therefore is immaterial to this case.

Romero's claim

that the July Note has not been satisfied is likewise immaterial
to this case, since the statute of limitations has run to enforce
such debt anyway, and in any event such claim does not raise a
dispute of fact since it was assumed for purposes of the
Oliversons' Motion only that the July Note had not been paid, as
Romero claims. Romero's assertion that he was told that Huish
was outside the State of Utah is inadmissible hearsay that is
also without foundation and legally insufficient to contradict
Huish's affidavit that he was at all relevant times within the
State of Utah.
Since, as a matter of law, the applicable statute of
limitations for Romero to foreclose the Trust Deed has expired,
the trial court correctly rendered summary judgment for the
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Oliversons.

This Court should uphold that ruling.

Respectfully submitted this

of February, 1998,

McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE
& PARKINSON, P.C.

By:.

M&A

dc-

Robert JiL Dale
Bradley L. Tilt
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES were hand-delivered
this iji^~day of February, 1998, to each of the following:
James R. Wilson
APPEL & WARLAUMONT, L.C.
9 Exchange Place
1100 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kirk G. Gibbs
Kipp and Christian, P.C.
10 Exchange Place, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and were mailed via first class mail, postage fully prepaid
thereon, to each of the following:
Gordon Duval
110 South Main Street
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
J. Scott Lundberg
P.O. Box 1290
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1290
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ADDENDUM

James R. Wilson, 6455
Jody L. Howe, 4743
HOWE & TANNER
Broadway Centre, Suite 340
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)575-7100
Facsimile: (801) 575-7150
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STEPHEN D. OLIVERSON and RUTH H.
OLIVERSON,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

vs.
Civil No. 940400709
LESTER ROMERO and J. SCOTT
LUNDBERG,

Judge: Anthony W. Schofield

Defendants.

AFFIANT BEING FIRST DULY SWORN DEPOSES AND STATES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

I am the defendant in the above-entitled proceeding, and submit this affidavit in

support of my memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
2.

With respect to the Trust Deed dated July 2, 1986, (the "Trust Deed") which was

recorded against the property and which is the subject of this lawsuit, it was, and is my

understanding that it secures a promissory note dated April 23, 1986, (the "Note"). (See Note
attached hereto as Exhibit "A").
3.

I have not received full payment or satisfaction of the obligation due under The Note.

4.

Both prior to, and subsequent to the "closing" referred to by plaintiff in their motion

for summary judgment, Mr. Huish ("Huish") and I reached agreements (the "Agreements") to extend
the amount of time in which Huish would satisfy the obligation owing under The Note. Pursuant
to the Agreements, Huish promised to make the monthly interest payments until he was able to
satisfy the entire balance due.
5.

I received the following payments from Huish as partial satisfaction of the amount

owing under the Note: $100.00, August 7, 1986; $100.00, November 15, 1987; $50.00, May 27,
1989; and $100.00, December 7, 1992. I am currently unable to locate copies of the canceled
checks evidencing the above-mentioned payments and believe them to be with my previous attorney.
6.

Because of the difficulty of getting Huish to satisfy the obligation owing under the

Note, I retained the services of Mr. Ben Browning, an attorney and G.L. Hackett & Company, a
collection agency. Mr. Browning received at least one payment from Huish, after which he sent me
a letter as well as a check for $50.00. (See letter attached hereto as Exhibit "B"). In addition, G.L.
Hackett & Company received at least one payment from Huish. (See receipt attached hereto as
Exhibit "C").
7.

I have spent considerable time and effort in attempting to locate Huish in order to

arrange further payments of the Note. In 1992 and 1993, I was informed by Huish's landlords, as
well as by the plaintiffs, that Huish had left the State of Utah.
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DATED this

)I

day of October, 1996.

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss

SUBSCRffiED TO AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public, by Lester
Romero, this

//

day of

C(+ilJl

I . 1996.
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^dituxeatv, Utah 84111
^Comn*M«ne*DtrB3S/flK*
STATE OF UTAH
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|

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

PROMISSORY NOTE (Interest)

f^
19

The undersigned, jointly and severally, premise to pay to the order of..

Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may designate

in writino

T-^T

s

Sx

*

j

£

"THjt/h\^i

i

X

J

f

A^O

i

^

^

poyob.e o. ,o.,ows,
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/io(j Ooawi
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/cwfttufioi*

/WCflninci

together both before and after judgment, with interest on the unpaid balance thereof from date until paid at the rate of . 5 ? . . / . . Z ^ f m t cent [..J.
per annum, interest payable as followst

%)

Prepayment of this note with interest to date of payment may be made at any time without penalty.
If the holder deems itself insecure or if default be made in payment of the whole or any part of any installment at the time when or the place
where the same becomes due and payable as aforesaid, then the entire unpaid balance, with interest as aforesaid, shall, at the election of the holder
hereof and without notice of said election at once become due and payable. In event of any such default or acceleration, the undersigned, jointly and
severally, agree to pay to the holder hereof reasonable attorney's fees, legal expenses and lawful collection costs in addition to all other sums due
hereunder.
Presentment, demand, protest, notice of dishonor and extension of time without notice are hereby waived and the undersigned consent to the
release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.

:: (^

r/V! Q o

Address

FORM etS - INTEREST NOTE - GEM PRINTING CO - SALT LAKE CITY UTAH

Exhibit A
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bEN

BROWNING

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

1020

KEARNS

BLD.

SALT LAKE CITY, UT

May 27, 1989

Dear Les,
Enclosed 500.00

collected on Ray Hall.

Received 50.00 from Bob
I

will

keep working on

K

Huish.
your

other accounts,

Sincerly,

Exhibit B

TELEPHONE (801) 364-1100

0380

(ok

4^M

G. L. HACKETT & COMPANY
901-02 C O N T I N E N T A L B A N K B U I L D I N G

NO.

P H O N E : 359-2833

S A L T L A K E C I T Y , U T A H 84101

DATE

Y[oT?^

RECEIVED

T

^

-19&

DOLLARS

(£<S&
AMOUNT or ACCOUNT £
AMOUNT PAID

BALANCE DUE . . . . . .
CASH D
FORM N O .

CHECK D

G. L . H A C K E T T & COMPANY

S.

. THANK YOU.

S _ _

Br\/»^ZX^.

M. O. Q

1703

Exhibit C
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